“We were flying with paper maps”: The state of Russia’s civil aviation under sanctions

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The names of the individuals interviewed have been changed for their safety.

Paper maps

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian airlines have been cut off from aeronautical charts and navigation databases supplied by Western companies, leading to pilots being told to fly with paper maps. Russian developers attempted to create domestic alternatives to Western aviation software, but these were either cumbersome or riddled with errors.

Ivan, a former pilot with a Russian airline:

“Globally there are several major providers of aeronautical charts and procedures. The most common are the American Jeppesen system and the German LIDO. Both support the worldwide update standard: every 28 days the navigation database is updated simultaneously across the globe.

Aeroflot switched to LIDO 10 years ago. But with sanctions, the transmission of aeronautical information to Russia was banned. Aeroflot was left without charts. No one stopped flights — everyone kept flying in violation of regulations.”

Vasily, a Boeing 737-800 pilot:

“We used American Jeppesen charts. When Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014, navigation there changed — there were no approach procedures, and air traffic frequencies were altered. But by 2015, Simferopol Airport was fully in our charts. Money could fix everything back then.

When Boeing and Airbus left the Russian market in 2022, aeronautical data was still supplied for another month. After that, no one knew what to do. There was the option to use paper charts. Every country publishes its own aeronautical information package, and sanctions can’t block that. Any country can request charts and get data from another.

And for a while we really did fly with paper binders. We had a huge suitcase with charts for all countries. Everything you can now open easily on a tablet, we had on paper. Only after six months to a year did Russian analogues of American and German apps appear. At first they were crude, but now they’re functional.

Today we fly with electronic tablets. The charts on them are basically no different from paper ones. But legally we were obliged to use paper to have 100% current data.”

Ivan, a former pilot with a Russian airline:

“After the invasion, Aeroflot frantically searched for a new supplier of aeronautical data and found a small St. Petersburg firm called Aeromap, which developed the SkyBagPro app. The company grew rapidly. But you can’t produce high-quality charts quickly. There were many errors — for example, in approach procedures. Relying on those charts, an aircraft could end up in the wrong place.”

Ilya, a first officer on an Airbus A330/A350:

“Flight planning for Aeroflot is handled by iFly and Rossiya Airlines. But it’s very difficult — different routes, different calculation formats, crews not trained on them, no idea who prepared them. The reliability of this data is very questionable. The calculation format is set in company documents and can’t just be changed — let alone ignored altogether. But now, if you resist and say, ‘According to your own rules this isn’t allowed,’ you’ll likely be fired.

So now anything goes: flying without flight documents, without proper calculations, without hazard charts, without restricted area maps — including air defense zones. We load fuel roughly, by eye, knowing about how much is needed and adding another five tons just to be safe.”

Manual flight planning

Navigation is not the only problem for Russian airlines. Preflight calculations are now often done by hand, and weather checks rely on public websites — practices that violate international aviation standards.

Mikhail, captain of an Airbus A320:

“After the cyberattack in July 2025, Aeroflot lost almost all of its databases, including navigation data and flight-planning systems. Flight planning is very complex, which is why there is a whole profession of flight dispatcher — an employee who typically handles several flights at once.

Planning starts about three hours before departure, sometimes earlier. The dispatcher monitors the flight throughout. If something changes, they can renegotiate the route in real time. Every route must be approved by the countries it crosses. If even one country does not give approval, the flight cannot proceed. That system has now collapsed — everything is done manually.

Flights within Russia are mostly mid-range aircraft. Their crews use old calculations and pretend they reflect current conditions. In reality, they don’t: wind patterns change, route restrictions change, but crews have no information. They pull navigation data from the internet and weather from open sources. What’s the weather in Surgut? They just look it up: ‘Oh, looks fine. Let’s go.’ This does not comply with any international standards.”

Information can only be taken from an official source. Every number in a weather forecast is a legally significant parameter that crews rely on when deciding whether to take off and land. Naturally, safety is compromised because the main principle — sharing responsibility with official information providers — is being broken.

Ivan, a former pilot with a Russian airline:

“Previously, fuel planning for flights was also done with computer software. We mainly used the SABRE system, which airlines around the world rely on for calculations. Each flight plan included wind patterns, routes to avoid hazardous weather, danger zones, conflict areas, and so on. The fuel load is different for every flight: the heavier the aircraft, the more fuel is needed.

Now all these calculations are done by hand because the systems no longer work. To calculate the required fuel, you need to consider many factors: the aircraft’s load, its nominal fuel consumption. Each plane is different — it can vary by hundreds of liters. If you don’t load enough fuel, you may not make it to your destination.

The same applies to the weather. For every airport and aviation station, meteorological data is collected to generate short-term forecasts for the next two hours and long-term ones for 24 or 36 hours. They specify everything: cloud height and density, temperature, pressure, dew point, wind gust probability. After the cyberattack on Aeroflot, this system sometimes works, sometimes doesn’t, and people just check aviation weather on the internet.”

“Nobody knows who’s flying where”

Because of the war, GPS signals over Moscow and other Russian regions are being distorted. As a result, aircraft instruments incorrectly determine their coordinates, forcing pilots to make false maneuvers to avoid obstacles. Due to issues with GPS, crews are flying with their collision-avoidance systems turned off, while military systems can mistake a civilian aircraft for a threat and attack it.

Yuri, captain of an Airbus A320:

“The GPS problems are enormous. A very dangerous phenomenon for aviation has emerged — GPS spoofing, when equipment on the ground doesn’t just jam a satellite signal but alters it. This isn’t limited to Moscow; it happens over large parts of Russia. As a result, an aircraft picks up a false signal and places itself somewhere else. It’s extremely dangerous.

There are also systems that separate planes from each other and from obstacles on the ground. For example, if you take off toward the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the plane, at a certain distance, will warn the crew of a possible collision. Right now, Russian pilots are ordered to turn off this system and ignore its recommendations. Because of GPS spoofing in Moscow, some pilots disable it even at low altitudes, where it is most effective.

We also turn off the air traffic collision-avoidance system. All civilian aircraft carry TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). Because GPS coordinates are constantly scrambled, the system may think the plane is in dangerous proximity not only to the ground but also to another aircraft. Then TCAS starts issuing separation commands.

On most Aeroflot planes, it won’t take control but in conditions of no visibility it will suggest a maneuver. If another aircraft is below, above, or behind, you can’t see it — you have to follow the separation command. But now we are forced to abandon systems built up over decades in civil aviation and instead rely on old navigation methods that provide far less accuracy and safety.

And there’s also the military sector. If it doesn’t know a plane is civilian, it may treat it as a threat. The crash of the Azerbaijani airliner near Grozny wasn’t unique — especially with the chaos we have now.

With manual flight clearance, nobody knows which plane is flying where. Worldwide, the system works like this: each plane is assigned a unique code visible to air traffic control and military authorities in every country it flies over. Now this is being done manually. Codes are still being issued, but whether they are entered correctly and who is responsible is a very big question.”

“The plane was swapped four times before takeoff”

Since 2022, cases of Russian airlines replacing aircraft right before scheduled departures due to technical faults have increased. Planes with defects are often stripped for parts. Still, Russian carriers have managed to set up parallel imports of components through third countries — albeit at several times the original cost, employees say.

Andrei, a Boeing 747-400 pilot:

“When a pilot comes to the aircraft, he opens the technical logbook, which lists all malfunctions. Some are acceptable, some aren’t. Often, aircraft with system failures are swapped out just before departure. One pilot told me he had a case where the plane was changed four times.

If an aircraft can’t be flown due to defects, it’s left at the airport, either awaiting repair or to be used as a donor for spare parts. At the airline where I used to work, 19 planes are idle like that. When I fly into Sheremetyevo, I can see them. This is now a widespread phenomenon.

Foreign airlines park idle planes in Madrid because of the dry climate — just 10% humidity, unlike Moscow. If an aircraft isn’t flown, it quickly becomes unfit for service. Restoring it later is very difficult — even possible. Our climate doesn’t allow planes to sit idle for long. An aircraft has to be in constant operation.”

Dmitry, an engineer:

“Predictions of global ‘cannibalization’ of aircraft — tearing them down for parts — didn’t really come true, because gray-market supply chains work. Some components are hard to find, but ultimately it’s just a question of price. If you pay three times more, even respectable countries will sell under the table.”

Vasily, a Boeing 737-800 pilot:

“There’s a list of acceptable defects with which a plane can be released for flight. For example, if the weather radar isn’t working, you can still fly — but only under certain conditions, such as no hazardous weather along the route, no rain, and good visibility. But if an engine has reached the end of its service life, there’s nothing you can do but replace it.

We had one aircraft like that, and it was stripped heavily for parts. In 2023 it was sitting without an engine. Later, when new components were purchased, it was gradually reassembled and returned to service. Aeroflot does this often. They have a large fleet and actively practice this kind of ‘cannibalization.’

There are big problems with the new Airbus A320s. Their new-generation engines are extremely temperamental. They’re fuel-efficient but very difficult to maintain.”

Dmitry, an engineer:

“Aeroflot has more than a hundred Airbus aircraft equipped with CEO and NEO engines. CEO stands for ‘classic engine option,’ while NEO stands for ‘new engine option.’ The NEO engines are 10-15% more efficient and use more advanced technologies. Aeroflot can’t repair these engines, so it chooses not to spend money. NEO-equipped aircraft are used only on long-haul routes that CEO planes can’t reach.

The same goes for the A350s. Very few facilities are capable of servicing them. Out of five in Aeroflot’s fleet, only four are actually in operation. The fifth is in poor condition, partially dismantled to keep the others flying.”

Parts imports cut by 70%

Between 2021 and 2024, imports of foreign aircraft engines and components into Russia fell from $152 million to $43 million, according to customs data. While in the past airlines purchased complete engines with that money, most of today’s shipments consist only of spare parts. Russian companies have continued buying components from Ukraine’s Motor Sich, totaling more than $12 million in 2024.

While purchases previously went directly through manufacturers or European suppliers, today parts are sourced in China, Dubai, Qatar, the Cayman Islands, Uganda, and even Afghanistan. A significant share of deliveries comes through Turkish firms such as the Istanbul-based Natak Havacilik. Some suppliers, like Gareks Havacilik, are officially registered as auto parts dealers in Istanbul's industrial zones.

Breakdowns that stop short of major accidents are now routine. According to research by Novaya Gazeta Europe, 2024 saw a record number of malfunctions of civilian aircraft — more than 200. In 2021, the figure was less than 90.

Dmitry, an engineer:

“Every aircraft has fixed maintenance intervals: daily checks every 36 hours, weekly inspections, and so on. The most demanding is a D-check once every 12 years. Maintenance teams at any airline, including Aeroflot, have stuck to this schedule both before and after sanctions. The problem is that some parts simply can’t be replaced.

Take brakes, for example. Aeroflot had a shortage of them. What did the company do? It issued instructions to pilots to use brakes sparingly and vacate the runway at the end instead of in the middle, as before. That’s dangerous because if traction worsens, there’s a real risk of overrunning the runway.

Second, it means the aircraft occupies the runway longer, reducing airport throughput. The system is put under additional strain that it isn’t always ready for. A brake set on an actively used plane lasts about two months before it needs replacing, and the cost easily exceeds that of a Mercedes X-Class. It’s extremely expensive either way.

Before, brakes were bought directly from Airbus or certified manufacturers that guaranteed compliance with safety standards. Now those ties are broken, and Russian companies are forced to buy from third-party suppliers with unclear sourcing. They might claim to be buying from Airbus — for example, via Turkish firms that supposedly purchase for themselves but in reality resell to Russia.

As a result, Aeroflot pays two to three times the real cost for these parts but has no way to verify their quality. If they’re sold brakes from an underground factory in China, they probably won’t know. That’s absolutely a safety risk. And this is the case for every spare part.”

Maintenance in Arkhangelsk

Since the war began, Russian airliners have been cut off from servicing in Western maintenance centers, prompting the creation of domestic facilities in Arkhangelsk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. Specialists from American and European companies reportedly visit these centers “unofficially.” Repair problems have been compounded by data losses: after a cyberattack, Aeroflot lost all information about the condition of aircraft equipment and its archive of flight logs.

Vasily, a Boeing 737-800 pilot:

“Before, all aircraft were serviced abroad — in Turkey, in Europe. Now Russia has opened huge maintenance centers: one in Arkhangelsk, and others in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Aircraft undergo a full maintenance cycle there, any complexity except engine repair. Rumor has it that specialists from big companies — guys from Lufthansa, from American Airlines — come unofficially and explain what to do.”

Dmitry, an engineer:

“Every mechanism on a plane has its service life and can fail. As a pilot, you get on board and see something doesn’t work. What do you do? You open the MEL [Minimum Equipment List] to check if the aircraft can legally fly with that malfunction.

Officially, an airline cannot ease MEL requirements. But since the war began, Aeroflot has moved away from these rules. They rewrote internal documents, and now many malfunctions that used to ground an aircraft are treated as acceptable. A plane could only fly with an expired database for 10 days — and only under strict limits. Now those databases have officially been out of date for three years.

After hackers wiped almost all of Aeroflot’s systems, we lost the ability to track the airworthiness of onboard equipment. Every unit, every light bulb was certified — we knew where it was made and its service life. That guaranteed safety. Now all that is gone.

Worse, the equipment was already being bought through ‘gray’ channels. Now even that isn’t traceable because the data is erased. Some things can be reconstructed from handwritten flight logs, but those are difficult to decipher, especially if only copies remain. Rebuilding this information is a massive task that is almost impossible to do properly.

Right now we’re working in constant emergency mode, collecting all this information and trying to move it from paper back into databases. It’s extremely serious. Not just engine wear — every single part has to be tracked. From a technical standpoint, Aeroflot has lost a great deal. Flying on the company’s planes is much less safe now than before the cyberattack, and certainly less safe than before the war.”

Mikhail, an Airbus A320 captain:

“There’s very little information about cargo. You can’t tell if you’re carrying three tons of something benign, or three tons of material that, if it ignites, requires an immediate landing to avoid disaster. Under the Geneva Convention, weapons can’t be transported on civilian aircraft, but in practice such items may be on board — just labeled differently. There’s even this amusing category of ‘consumer goods.’ In theory, almost anything can be filed under it.”